Somali Bantus in a State of Refuge
Catherine Besteman

I. Introduction
In 1999, the United States government decided to accept up to 12,000
Somali Bantu refugees for resettlement. The refugees, who had lived in
Kenyan refugee camps since fleeing Somalia’s civil war in 1992, were
the largest group of African refugees ever accepted for resettlement
in the United States. As illiterate, non-English speaking, uneducated,
rural subsistence farmers, they were also markedly different from most
previously admitted refugees. Only a miniscule number of African refugees had been accepted for resettlement during the Cold War years,
when the U.S. defined a refugee as someone fleeing communism and
almost all admitted refugees came from Soviet Bloc countries, Cuba,
and Indochina. To many observers, the decision to accept Somali Bantu
refugees appeared to mark a new direction in U.S. refugee resettlement
policy from one motivated by foreign policy concerns and national
interest priorities to one defined by an ethic of humanitarianism.
II. The Background
The 1999 offer of refuge to Somali Bantu refugees was based on
their identification as a persecuted minority group who could never
be expected to return to Somalia. The majority of those identified as
Somali Bantu came from farming communities along the Jubba and
Shabelle rivers in southern Somalia and who were considered physically distinct from other Somalis and inferior in status because of their
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non-Somali ancestry and occupation. Some are descended from East
African slaves imported into Somalia in the 19th century; others are
descended from farming communities that were already settled along
the Shabelle River prior to the arrival in the Horn of Somali-speaking
pastoralists centuries ago.1 While the majority of Somali Bantu shared
linguistic, cultural, and religious practices with other Somalis, their
racialized identity, distinct ancestry, and sedentary life as farmers distinguished them from other Somalis and made them vulnerable targets
in Somalia’s civil war.
After the 1991 collapse of Somalia’s government, Somali militias ravaged farming villages along the Jubba Valley with rape, murder, pillage, torture, kidnapping, and extortion in an onslaught of violence that
Somalia expert Kenneth Menkhaus has called “a holocaust.”2 Human
rights organizations at the time catalogued the horrors experienced by
Somalia’s minority farmers, describing how they were attacked by all
factions and defended by none.3
Like other Somalis escaping the militia violence, Somalia’s minority farmers also fled to the sprawling Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya
where they experienced further abuse from other refugees. Camp
administrators and international aid workers reported the humiliating
treatment of minorities in the camps, where they had greater difficulty
accessing food, shelter, and firewood, and suffered higher levels of
rape, assault, and the looting of food by their fellow refugees.4 Minority Somalis also performed most of the manual labor in the camps,
such as construction, portage, digging latrines, and hauling water.5
By 1993, the minority Somalis had developed a shared ethnic self-consciousness and a leadership that had begun to investigate resettlement
options. Along with camp administrators, the leaders began using the
term “Somali Bantu” to distinguish and encompass minority Somalis
in order to seek additional forms of protection.6 By 1995, the United
Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) had identified the
Somali Bantu as a “priority protection case worthy of third-country
resettlement,” according to a former UNHCR field officer in Dadaab.7
Efforts in 1993 and 1997 to resettle the Somali Bantu in Tanzania and
Mozambique—from where some of their ancestors had originated—
had failed and the UNHCR began negotiating with non-African countries for a resettlement solution.8

12

Catherine Besteman

III. A Humanitarian Choice?
Cold War politics dominated U.S. resettlement priorities from the 1950s
until the early 1990s, during which time the U.S. resettled over two million refugees, more than 90 percent of whom were from Communist
countries.9 Although the Refugee Act of 1980 broadened the definition
of refugee to include people from other areas of the world, the number
of Africans accepted for resettlement in the United States remained tiny,
especially in relation to the growing number of refugees within Africa.
Legal scholar Heidi Boas argues that the U.S. offer of resettlement to
Somali Bantu (as well as to the Sudanese “Lost Boys”) demonstrated
that the power of interest groups and the ethic of humanitarianism
had become more significant than foreign policy objectives in the decision about who would receive refuge.10 Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, some of whom participated in NGO-hosted trips
to African refugee camps during the 1990s, successfully lobbied to
raise the ceiling on African refugees accepted for resettlement. Aware
of this pressure, the UNHCR advocated for Somali Bantus as a particularly vulnerable group. In response the United States offered them
P2 status, which is a status given to groups “of special humanitarian
concern.” It is noteworthy that the Center for Immigration Studies, a
partisan anti-immigrant organization, lamented the offer of refuge to
Somali Bantus as indicative of a shift from foreign policy and national
interest to a “global human rights agenda” as the guiding force of U.S.
refugee resettlement.11
Following the announcement of the resettlement plan, news reports
across the U.S. promoted the image of U.S. humanitarian benevolence
in choosing the Somali Bantu for resettlement. Because of their illiteracy, lack of education, rural background, large families, and history
of persecution, Somali Bantu were widely described as particularly
needy and unprepared for modern life. Descriptions such as “Africa’s
lost tribe” (New York Times 2003), “feudal serfs” (Refugees Magazine
2002), and “among the most persecuted people on earth” (National
Geographic 2003) highlighted their vulnerability, simple background,
technological naiveté, and history of exploitation as the descendents of
slaves.12
News accounts also revealed acute fascination with a primitivemeets-modern theme, demonstrated in the repeated contrast between
Somali Bantu pre-war life and the life that awaited them in the U.S.:
“Most have never seen a light switch or telephone, or even a building

13

Bildhaan

Vol. 12

that wasn’t made of mud” (Newsweek 2002); “They are sturdy farmworkers with few other skills, who have never turned on an electric
light switch, used a flush toilet, crossed a busy street, ridden in a car
or on an elevator, seen snow or experienced air conditioning” (Refugees Magazine 2002); and they are “almost completely untouched by
modern life…They measure time by watching the sun rise and fall over
their green fields and mud huts” (New York Times 2003).13
A Horatio Alger undercurrent accompanied their characterization
as contemporary primitives. An editorial in Refugee Magazine (2002)
called them “a lucky few” and a New York Times article lauded the
U.S. as “A Place of Miracles” for the refugees, while the Center for
Immigration Studies complained that Somali Bantu refugees won “the
jackpot” with the “dazzling” opportunity to come to America.14 While
celebrating the “dazzling” opportunity afforded by the resettlement
plan news accounts and policy documents nevertheless predicted that
the transition to life in the U.S. would be difficult and challenging for
resettled Somali Bantu. That the United States was willing to accept
such people implied that a humanitarian ethic, rather than national
self-interest, had motivated the resettlement offer. This coincides with
the argument of legal scholar Heidi Boas, who published the first academic analysis of the Somali Bantu resettlement. Noting that Somali
Bantu needed “round the clock help in navigating through a culture so
different from their own,” Boas writes, “Given the extreme difficulty
the Somali Bantu were predicted to have in adapting to American
life, it seems particularly significant that the U.S. government selected
them for resettlement.”15 Her article documents how the hard work of
refugee activists, along with a push by the U.S. Congressional Black
Caucus to correct the racial imbalance of refugee acceptance during the
1990s, spurred the humanitarian choice to select for resettlement a very
small group who brought no relevant skills, education, resources, family ties, or international significance with them.
IV. The Resettlement Process
The attacks of September 11, 2001 challenged the humanitarian rationale for Somali Bantu resettlement. Although the U.S. State Department announced the Somali Bantu P2 designation in December 1999,16
it took almost four years to resettle the first Somali Bantu family
because of numerous delays. Indeed, congressional testimony about
the post 9/11 fate of the Somali Bantu raises questions about the initial
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humanitarian commitment. Bill Frelick, Director of Policy for the U.S.
Committee on Refugees, expressed his frustration with the attitude of
the government toward resettling refugees in his February 12, 2002 testimony to the Senate Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee:
I will hasten to add that very few of the groups that I would mention
would be ones that would unfamiliar [sic] to the State Department. We
have been in discussions with them for years on some of these groups,
Somali Bantu in Kenya, for example, or the Baku Armenians in Moscow,
and I’d have to say that the response has often been bureaucratic, passive, and at times downright uncaring and cynical.17

Leonard Glickman of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society broke in to
add that although the State Department had appeared to be reforming
the resettlement process:
It sort of ground to a halt this end of the summer, this past fall, and
nothing has happened, and I think one of the most startling examples
of that is the Somali Bantu. I mean, it was clearly identified as a group
that were in need of resettlement, in need of the protection of the United
States. Everybody was on the same page, including PRM [U.S. State
Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration], that this
was a group that—and UNHCR, that this was a group that needed our
services, and not a single Somali Bantu has arrived in the United States.
It’s outrageous.18

Defending the resettlement policy, Gene Dewey, the newly minted
Director of PRM, reminded the Senate Subcommittee: “Perhaps only
in America are the people and its leaders capable of waging a major
military campaign while keeping the imperatives of humanity both in
assistance and refugee admissions at the top of the national agenda.”
In fact, refugee admissions were not a priority that year, when the
U.S. filled far less than half of the 70,000 slots designated for refugees.
Despite the fact that the Somali Bantu had already been accepted and
screened for resettlement, they were given none of the 2002 slots and
only 803 of the 70,000 slots in 2003.19
The primary reason for the delays, catalogued in a State Department
“Case Study of Processing Complexity and Unforeseen Delays,” was
security concerns.20 The Somali Bantu had been through a screening
process in 1997 after the failed resettlement effort in Mozambique.
In 2001, the UNHCR and State Department completed a thorough
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re-verification of the Somali Bantu from the 1997 list, but because the
Dadaab refugee camp was deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel to
visit for the final screening, the agencies decided to truck all 11,860 reverified Somali Bantu over 900 miles to distant Kakuma refugee camp
in the northwest corner of Kenya at a cost of US $2.7 million. (In a wry
aside, The Economist commented, “They have been through a lot—persecution in their homeland, civil war, a decade languishing in refugee
camps, and the tragi-comic experience of being trucked across Kenya
to meet American officials who dared not visit them.”21)
The first planned visit to Kakuma by Department of Homeland
Security officers was cancelled because of fears of insecurity for U.S.
personnel in the camp. Processing was further delayed by a corruption
scandal. An unexplained post-approval processing delay blocked any
resettlements in 2002 and 2003. With no hint of irony, the State Department report explained, “This lag necessitated a new round of security
and medical clearances, because such clearances are good only for a
limited period.” New security concerns, and then flooding, further
delayed the processing of new cases until 2004, by which time the
processing of most Somali Bantu had taken five years.22 By the advent
of their resettlement, they, like other refugees who experienced similar
processing, were “one of the most heavily screened groups of prospective immigrants to the U.S.”23
Bill Frelick argues that during this period, U.S. policy toward refugees had shifted to a new, post-9/11 “security model”: “[I]n the early
twenty-first century, refugees often came to be regarded with deep
suspicion, sometimes seen as being terrorists themselves or as being
the sea in which the terrorist fish could hide and swim. Fear of terrorism often exacerbated preexisting xenophobic and racist tendencies.”24
Whereas during the Cold War years, refugees were viewed as heroic,
freedom loving, and politically valuable, Frelick says that after 9/11
they were suspected of colluding with terrorists: “Under the security
paradigm, refugees are devalued to the point where providing asylum
or intervening to provide source-country solutions are trumped by the
desire to keep terrorists out.”25
After the first few hundred Somali Bantu finally began arriving in
2003, the bulk of the population arrived during 2004–06. Their transition to life in America raises many questions about how “humanitarianism” is conceived within the American system of refugee resettlement.
Since 2006, I have been conducting ethnographic fieldwork with
the large Somali Bantu community in Lewiston, Maine, augmented
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by visits to the Somali Bantu communities of their family members in
Hartford, Connecticut, and Syracuse, New York. Many members of
the Somali Bantu community come from the village in Somalia where
I conducted ethnographic research in 1987–88 and thus I know their
family histories well. My research in Lewiston has many different
components and has included personal and group interviews with
refugees, citizens, service providers, journalists, police officers, teachers, physicians, and city officials; focus group interviews with local
service providers and ethnic mutual assistance associations; dozens
of hours in schools, ESL (English as a Second Language) courses, citizenship classes, and after-school tutoring programs for refugees; support work for the boards of local service agencies, advocacy groups,
community groups, and ethnic mutual assistance associations that aid
refugees; and public outreach projects developed collaboratively with
members of the refugee community such as museum exhibitions for
two local museums, public lectures and presentations, ESL booklets,
public reports, and media interviews.
V. Life in America
As noted earlier, many observers predicted a rocky transition in store
for Somali Bantu refugees in the U.S. Like the Hmong refugees from
Southeast Asia, who were resettled in the 1970s and 1980s, the vast
majority of the Somali Bantu refugees did not speak English, were
illiterate even in their own language, and had made their living as
small-scale farmers in rural areas unserved by electricity, paved
roads, running water, schools, or modern medical facilities. Unlike the
Hmong, they arrived in the U.S. under the hegemony of neo-liberal
ideology, strong anti-immigrant sentiment, and fear of Muslim terrorism. Furthermore, whereas many Americans understood the connection between the United States and the regions from where Hmong
originated because of the Vietnam War, the relationship of the United
States to the Horn of Africa was far less clear.
Although there was plenty of warning from those involved in the
resettlement process that the Somali Bantu would need a great deal of
support to make the transition to life in the U.S., no special allowance
was made for their adjustment. For example, the information clearinghouse for refugee resettlement, Bridging Refugee Youth and Childrens’
Services (BRYCS, www.brycs.org) posted numerous online reports
about resettlement issues for Somali Bantu. A Newsweek article about
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the impending arrival of Somali Bantu muses: “What happens next
is surprisingly unclear…Some relief officials worry that the government isn’t doing enough to ready the Bantus for life in America, and
that those who are unable to find jobs will wind up trading one kind
of poverty for another.” “We are doing them a disservice by not preparing them properly,” says Kate Hilton-Hayward, who co-chairs the
Somali Bantu Task Force at the Refugee Council USA. “If the economy
bottoms out, we may have trouble finding them jobs,” she admits. The
article concludes by quoting one man awaiting resettlement: “ ‘I hear
the government lets you keep a cow wherever you want in America,’
he says with obvious pleasure. ‘I need a cow, because I need fresh
milk.’ Imagine his surprise.”26 In fact, Somali Bantus received far less
support than had the Hmong. Hmong refugees received up to three
years of direct federal support, as well as greater support for English
language classes. Somali Bantu were expected to be entirely self-sufficient within eight months of their arrival in the U.S.
This expectation of near immediate self-sufficiency reveals a great
deal about the guiding principles of refugee resettlement in the U.S.
Heidi Boas flatly states that the policy of rapid self-sufficiency condemns refugees to an intergenerational cycle of poverty and “is hardly
a humanitarian act on the part of the United States.”27
Refuge resettlement in the United States is handled by ten different
nonprofit agencies (called VOLAGS, for voluntary agencies) that, in
effect, bid on the number of refugees they can resettle in their respective locations. Every year, each of the VOLAGS submits its bid to the
State Department, which apportions the refugees arriving that year
amongst the VOLAGS who resettle them in various locations across
the country. The VOLAGS are responsible for meeting the arriving
refugees at the airport, providing some cultural orientation training,
settling them in housing, enrolling the children in school and the nonEnglish speaking adults in ESL classes, and if possible helping those
over the age of sixteen to apply for jobs. Their contracts for assisting
new refugees end after 90 days.
The role of VOLAGS in the resettlement process has its contradictions because they are self-identified as humanitarian but through the
competitive bid system and attenuated resettlement schedule, they
must operate like businesses. They are contracted and funded by the
federal government to provide caseworker assistance to refugees during their first weeks in the U.S., but have no enduring connection or
obligation to those they resettle after their contracts cease. There is
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little follow up or accountability from the government to assess how
the resettled refugees are faring.
In addition to support from VOLAG caseworkers, refugees who
qualify could receive $230 per person per month (in 2010) through the
federal Refugee Cash Assistance Program for their first eight months.
The U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement is quite clear that when these
funds end, refugees are expected to be self-sufficient and no longer in
need of federal, state, or local support. As a VOLAG manager in Maine
told me, “The ultimate goal of the reception and placement program
is that clients will be self-sufficient within 90 days.” VOLAGS are supposed to try to keep refugees off the welfare roles and thus one of
their primary concerns is moving resettled refugees as quickly as possible into available jobs, which are usually poorly paid, undesirable,
unskilled jobs with no opportunities for training or career development. After their first year, refugees are also required to begin repaying the cost of their airfare from the refugee camp to the U.S.
Following the resettlement of Somali Bantu in cities across the country, news articles began appearing about their shock at the high cost of
living; their challenge to find jobs that do not require English, literacy,
or any education; and their struggles to make ends meet. Many families found they could not afford the rent for the apartments where they
were settled by the VOLAGs after their federal support ended. Some
families fell immediately into debt because they did not understand
how to turn down the heat or realize the high cost of long-distance
phone calls and thus ran up enormous bills that they could not pay.
Those who acquired jobs found that the $7–8 per hour they could earn
barely supported their family.
Anthropologists have had harsh things to say about the expectation of nearly immediate self-sufficiency for war-traumatized resettled
refugees, especially those who lack English and relevant job skills.
Writing about Cambodians resettled in California, Aihwa Ong traces
the administrative logic that constructs new subjectivities for resettled
refugees. She describes how the “helping professions” who work with
refugees focus their assistance on providing training to make resettled refugees into “cheap labor for America’s postindustrial economy,”
expected to work in any kind of high flexibility “junk job” that comes
their way. She concludes that newcomers are taught by VOLAGS and
social service providers to constitute themselves as neo-liberal citizensubjects who are supposed to replace their networks of reciprocal care
and tight community integration with an emphasis on independence,
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autonomy, and individualism, even though there is no assurance that
they will ever obtain economic security.28
Both Ong and Fethi Keles, who has worked with Balkan refugees
in upstate New York, argue that the neo-liberal emphasis on economic
independence and self-sufficiency is fundamentally dehumanizing
for resettled refugees. It strips them of a positive sense of connection
to broader immigrant networks who pool resources, of self-esteem
because of the expectation that they are destined for the lowest quality
jobs, of their own cultural values, and of the validity of their personal
history. It almost ensures that they will enter the American underclass
and struggle with poverty. Keles writes of the impact on mental health
of refugees who are struggling to make ends meet and who feel inadequate and socially unmoored from their past: “The neo-liberal work
ethic hermetically seals possible avenues to socialization, emphasizes
economic independence and self sufficiency above all else and seems
to expect refugees to continually rewrite their fates anew, never looking back at either their past jobs and skills or their past identities.”29
Read through this lens, the resettlement process for refugees like
the Somali Bantu in the U.S. appears strangely uncharitable. Is the
“humanitarian charity” provided by resettlement defined only by
geography, in that Somali Bantu refugees were allowed to come here,
at their own expense, and receive a few months of very limited support? Does humanitarianism only extend to the concept of refuge in
a physical sense: that the U.S. will provide a relatively safe physical
environment within which refugees can attempt, with very little assistance, to create a new future?
VI. What Happened in Lewiston
My family came here without a dime in their pocket. There was no welfare system to leech off. They had to make it work and they did. They
made Lewiston/Auburn what it is today. They didn’t do it so refugees
could rape our system till it’s dry.
liam, blog in response to a January 30, 2010 Lewiston Sun Journal
article about Lewiston’s experience with refugees.
These are NOT United States citizens on United States Soil and are a
threat to National Security just as any other terrorist is. These are terrorists.
ArmyMom, blog in response to a December 17, 2009 Lewiston Sun
Journal article about a police investigation of alleged attacks by
Somalis in downtown Lewiston.
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Am I disgruntled that federal and state dollars are being used to supply immigrants with housing food clothes and vehicles? YOUR DAMN
STRAIGHT.
Dee In Maine
They [Somali refugees] are human leaches brought her to suck off the liberal maine system…When did maine become the welfare state to house
and feed the worlds misfits.
Megalito
The Somalis over-populated Lewiston, drained it’s money and resources,
and cried discrimination constantly…They are at DHHS [Department of
Health and Human Services] requesting welfare daily. The majority of
Somalis are unemployed. Our schools are overcrowded with children
who don’t speak English. Lewiston…is down the tubes.
cojr
Online blogs (with original spelling) in response to a January 2009 article
in Newsweek claiming that the arrival of refugees saved Lewiston.30

Lewiston was not prepared for the arrival of refugees. The city of
about 35,000 is an old mill town built largely by French Canadians
who came to work in the textile and shoe mills a century ago. Although
Bates College brings a temporary influx of students every year, the
city’s population has remained predominantly Franco-American,
Catholic, and insular. When the late 20th century wave of deindustrialization closed the mills, Lewiston started losing its youth to more prosperous places and few immigrants chose Lewiston as their new home.
The densely packed tenement apartments in the downtown area had
many low rent vacancies and the city’s almost entirely white population was shrinking.
In 2001, a few Somali refugee families relocated to Lewiston from
their initial resettlement sites. After refugees are resettled by a VOLAG
they are under no obligation to remain in that location and VOLAGS
are under no obligation to track those refugees. Many Somali refugees were initially settled in public housing projects in large cities like
Atlanta and St. Louis, where they felt unsafe and insecure. After their
first few months, a few families relocated to Portland, Maine, to join
relatives, and gradually more families began moving up to Maine. By
early 2001, public housing in Portland was full and the city sent a few
Somali families further north to Lewiston. After settling in Lewiston,
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those families invited their relatives to join them from their primary
resettlement cities, and the number of Somalis arriving in Lewiston
began to grow throughout 2001. Within a year about a thousand had
arrived. The city and the school district were totally unequipped for
the arrival of so many secondary refugees.
The City of Lewiston’s General Assistance staff helped locate housing for the new arrivals, but by 2002 city staff felt administratively,
economically, and socially overwhelmed by the influx of Somalis and
by the lack of support from the state as well as area nonprofits and
charitable organizations (including the sole VOLAG that operated
in Maine, which was initially uninvolved in supporting secondary
Somali migrants to Lewiston). City staff, who had little experience
with refugee resettlement or cultural diversity, were trying to manage
the provision of social services and educate themselves about the laws
concerning refugees’ entitlements for benefits.31 The mayor addressed
the matter by writing an open letter in 2002 to the Somali community
asking them to stop moving to Lewiston, suggesting that they had
emptied the city’s coffers and taxed city government to a breaking
point.32 The ensuing storm of controversy brought a white supremacist
group from Illinois to rally in defense of the city’s right to bar the door
against black refugees, which shocked and upset many Lewistonians
who did not perceive the mayor’s letter to be racist but rather driven
by budgetary concerns. The white supremacist rally was met with a
pro-diversity rally that attracted people from all over the state, including Maine’s Governor and U.S. Senators.
As the controversy faded, more Somalis continued to arrive. Drawn
by the presence of a Somali-speaking community and by the promise
of physical security, safe schools, and low rents, Somali Bantus began
relocating to Lewiston in late 2004 from their primary resettlement
sites. By 2009, perhaps 5,000 Somalis and Somali Bantus had relocated
to Lewiston (including a few hundred living in Auburn, the city adjacent to Lewiston). About 1,000 Somali-speaking children were enrolled
in the Lewiston public schools. Somalis and Somali Bantus had become
about 15 percent of the city’s population and a fifth of the school population.
Because Lewiston had not been designated a primary resettlement
site, it took many years to develop programs and services that supported the new refugee population. With the exception of the city’s
hardworking General Assistance staff and the nonprofit Trinity Jubilee Center (which redistributed donated food and clothing, provided
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caseworker services, and ran an afterschool homework help program),
most existing nonprofits and other service providers did not expand
their services or client base to include refugees. As had happened in
other cities, a complaint filed in 2006 against the School system for
its failure to develop an appropriate ESL program brought in the U.S.
Department of Justice to oversee its creation.33 Complaints against the
hospitals obligated them to provide adequate translation services. The
only VOLAG in the state, after an initial reluctance to become involved
with the Somali refugees, finally agreed to work with federal grants
to provide very basic services for secondary migrants, which primarily consisted of cultural orientation and citizenship classes and caseworker assistance. Even the federally funded downtown enterprise
zone organization ignored the presence of a large population of refugees in their targeted area and did not invite or include them in planning or funding projects.
In short, the overwhelming initial response in Lewiston to the arrival
of thousands of refugees was business as usual. The expectation was
that refugees would have to conform to local ways; that they deserved
no special outreach, services, or programming; that their presence
should have a minimal impact on the city; and that they should not
diminish the resources available to Lewiston’s prior citizens. The many
complaints about the new population quickly condensed into a set
of powerful narratives that often began, “I’m not a racist, but… . ”
The narratives reveal the ways in which Lewistonians felt that their
city was under cultural and economic siege. In op ed essays, letters to
the editor, blogs, and private conversations, Lewistonians complained
that Somalis were not learning English fast enough, that the women’s
distinct dress (including the hijab) was an affront to American norms,
and even that Somalis kept live chickens in their kitchen cupboards.
Many compared the assimilationist trajectory of their French-Canadian
parents and grandparents with what they perceived to be the cultural
isolationism of the Somalis. Simply put, many Lewistonians believed
Somalis and Somali Bantus were not becoming American quickly
enough and many suspected that the newcomers did not intend
to embrace American cultural values. Many Lewistonians feared that
the Muslim faith might even ally refugees with terrorist networks
abroad. Somali women, in particular, were regularly targeted in public
by people yelling things at them like “Go home” and “Dress like an
American.”
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Especially virulent comments circulated in private discussions as
well as in articles and on-line comments in the two local newspapers,
the Lewiston Sun Journal and the Twin City Times, about the economic
impact of the newcomers. Taking a cue from the mayor’s 2002 letter,
Lewistonians reiterated to each other and to me that Somalis were
an economic drain on the city, using up welfare benefits and public
and low-income housing, and ravaging the school budget because of
the need to create an ESL program. Myths circulated that all Somalis
were unemployed and, in fact, did not want to work because they
had become accustomed to welfare support. One particularly resilient
rumor circulated that Somali refugees received free new cars from the
government even though city officials repeatedly denied it. (In fact,
most Somalis do hold jobs, adult ESL classes are in such great demand
that there is a waiting list, and welfare statistics provided by Maine’s
Department of Health and Human Services show that only a small
percentage of the predominant forms of welfare assistance, Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families and food stamps, go to refugees.)
To be sure, some Lewistonians embraced the arrival of refugees and
worked hard to befriend and offer assistance to the newcomers. A former city employee who devoted countless unpaid hours in 2001–02 to
community education efforts about refugees and cultural skills classes
for refugees recalled: “To be a local [working with refugees] during
that time was awful. You were never not defending Somalis wherever
you went. You were never able to turn off your job.” More recently, a
blogger writing in response to an article in the local newspaper chastised some of the bloggers quoted above for their racist and condescending comments by arguing, “It is our capability to love and to care
that define us, where is this humanity, when we are shutting our doors
to neighbors where opportunities can be discovered. We now have a
whole new culture to learn about, and we do not even have to leave
our own backyard, what a beautiful gift.”34 Those who expressed support for the newcomers in blogs or private conversations emphasized
the benefits of diversity brought by the refugees. But the interviews,
conversations, and media reviews I conducted as part of my research
suggest that the far more universal sentiment was antagonistic and
unsympathetic. Most Lewistonians did not want their city to be a refuge and viewed the refugees as an unwelcome foreign presence and a
great economic burden.35
The slow and resistant extension of assistance and support to Lewiston’s new refugees by most city agencies and organizations and the
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outright hostility of many Lewistonians toward the refugees cannot
be viewed as peculiar to Lewiston but rather are indicative of broader
American patterns. The reaction to the arrival of refugees by the citizens
of Lewiston demonstrates how easily the rhetoric of economics trumps
all other concerns and eviscerates arguments about humanitarianism
and the benefits of diversity. While racism and fear of the foreign
undoubtedly played into Lewiston’s reaction, the primary objections to
the arrival of refugees were framed in terms of their economic impact.
Even though the facts show that the presence of refugees has brought
economic resources and vitality into the area (including, for example,
at least $9 million in grant funding during 2001–2010 and about 18 new
stores downtown owned and operated by Somalis),36 the public discourse about how much the refugees cost the city has only grown over
the past decade. Talking about money allows people who are unhappy
about refugees in their city to avoid accusations of racism and silences
dissenting humanitarian voices as out-of-touch “softies” and tax-andspend liberals.
VII. Refuge?
While criticisms of the refugee presence circulated in the hallways of
office buildings, schools, and businesses as well as in private conversations, online blogs and published editorials, the refugees themselves
were far more occupied with the daily challenge of creating refuge. In
cultural orientation classes held in the refugee camps that were supposed to prepare them for life in America, they were taught to expect
freedom, safety, the ability to have an education and a job, and the
benefits of democracy. Once they arrived in America, however, their
experience was far different from what their classes led them to expect.
What has refuge meant to Somali Bantus who are now living in Lewiston?
Despite the emphasis in the news articles cited above about the projected challenges of new technology, Somali Bantu refugees easily mastered everyday American technology. Within a few days Somali Bantu
refugees were flushing toilets, using washing machines, chatting on
cell phones, crossing busy streets, and cooking with gas and electricity.
Within a few months they were driving. The real challenges were overcoming the burden of grief and trauma, defining a new identity in the
U.S., adjusting to American cultural norms, and struggling to earn an
income and meet the expectation of economic self-sufficiency.
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For nearly every resettled Somali Bantu refugee, refuge in America
has meant abandoning family members in Kenya. During the process
of screening and rescreening, many Somali Bantu people were rejected
for resettlement because their American interviewers suspected they
were lying about their ethnicity or their kinship relations.37 While
about 10,000 were ultimately resettled in the U.S., at least 3,000 were
rejected and remain stuck in Kenya’s refugee camps. Families were
torn apart as the interviewers accepted some siblings for resettlement
and rejected others or accepted one spouse for resettlement but not the
other. Parents had to choose whether to come to the U.S. with some
children while abandoning others; husbands and wives had to decide
whether to come if it meant leaving their loved one and possibly their
children. Refuge in America has thus meant daily grief about those left
behind.
In addition to the grief of loss, many Somali Bantu refugees suffer
from terrible memories of the things that happened to them during the
war and experience daily stress from the challenges of adjusting to life
in America. Treating trauma and issues of mental health are left to the
private sector and voluntary organizations. Mental health is not prioritized as part of refuge, and the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR), which manages funding and policy for resettlement, offers
little beyond an acknowledgement that trauma and grief can hinder
a refugee’s ability to perform as a worker. In their first decade in Lewiston, no mental health agencies offered refugees culturally competent
services or programs.
For nearly every resettled Somali Bantu refugee, refuge in America
means living with a new identity and family constructed through the
resettlement process. People’s names were changed and birthdays were
assigned by interviewers (most adult Somali Bantu refugees in the U.S.
now have a birthday of January 1, which, paradoxically, police and
social services workers often view as an indication of fraudulent identities). Extended families were restructured to conform to U.S. kinship
norms. Polygamous marriages were dissolved as husbands were told
to choose one wife only, while the divorced wives and their children
were resettled separately or left behind. Parents accepted for resettlement whose adult children were rejected often tried to claim their
grandchildren as children, becoming their “parents” rather than their
grandparents. Many rejected for resettlement tried to send their children with other relatives or friends, thereby constituting new families.
Thus refuge means living in both kinship worlds: the world of the ref-
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ugee camp where one’s family loyalties and pre-resettlement identity
require ongoing support in the form of remittances, and the world of
Lewiston with a different name and a new family structure. Refugees
know that their juggling of identity to conform to resettlement criteria
is called fraud by U.S. authorities, and thus refuge has meant creating
a web of secrecy about their past and their dearest family members still
living in camps.
Somali Bantu refugees have quickly learned that refuge in the U.S.
means poverty. In the Orwellian words of one resettled Somali Bantu
woman, “There is freedom here. But you need a job to be free.”38 The
expectation that everyone over the age of sixteen will be employed
means that refugees—even those in high school—must emphasize
work over education. It imprisons those with limited English and literacy in the lowest wage, least secure, least desirable jobs for the rest
of their lives. It closes the doors to opportunity, to education, to professional development, and it turns the refugees into worker drudges at
the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy. For those with competent
English but less competent writing skills and no professional credentials, it means their best option often lies with seeking employment
as cultural brokers and oral translators, jobs that offer limited professional mobility or development. Many refugee adults in their 30s, who
work at minimum wage jobs as cart pushers, cleaners, and box cutters
in places like Walmart, Dunkin Donuts, and LL Bean, have told me that
they now recognize that this country offers no career opportunities for
them and their only hope is that their children might have a chance for
a better job.
“Since its enactment, nearly three million refugees who were once
persecuted in their home countries have resettled in the Land of the
Free,” says the Director of ORR in a poster celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Refugee Act of 1980. But the Land of the Free inhibits
many basic freedoms viewed as normal by Somali Bantus refugees.
The freedom to live without war has come at the cost of the freedom to
follow cultural practices. Somali Bantu refugees recognize that many
of their cultural practices are unacceptable in America—for example,
polygyny, spiritual healing practices that include trance and possession, the desire to observe Muslim prayer practices and holy days in
the workplace and at school, and the freedom to speak about their
frustrations and challenges with life in this country. They have learned
that these activities provide fuel for those who object to their presence
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and speculate about links between Muslim refugees and terrorists.
What does refuge mean in the context of racism and xenophobia?
Because refugees are supposed to be grateful and politically docile,
refuge can be experienced as a loss of political agency in relation to
their lives in their new communities. Their voices are silenced in local
public discourse because refugees are seen as economically impotent
and politically disenfranchised because they cannot apply for citizenship for five years—and even then only once they have learned enough
English to pass the test. Quoting Hannah Arendt’s observation (offered
in a different context) that refugees are denied the right to an opinion,
Peter Nyers comments, “Without citizenship, refugees are denied not
only political rights but also something more fundamental—the capacity to speak politically and the expectation that they will be heard.”39
Despite their public visibility in Lewiston, refugees are politically invisible. They have few political advocates because as nonvoters no one is
accountable to them. As citizens-in-waiting, Somalis cannot run for
office and have even been barred from serving on city task forces and
committees. The local NGOs that provide support services for refugees
are not necessarily political advocates or activists for refugees because
their funding depends on maintaining good relationships with donors
and administrators, most of whom treat refugee affairs with great caution. (One remarkable exception in Lewiston is the former mayor, Larry
Gilbert, whose term ended in 2011, who often spoke out forcefully and
publicly about the benefits to Lewiston of the Somali population.) Furthermore, the practice of deportation for criminal convictions means
noncitizen refugees are actually held to a higher standard than citizens,
for whom rehabilitation rather than deportation follows jail time.40
Evaluating the humanitarianism of U.S. resettlement practices thus
appears complex. A resettlement agenda that insists on low wage,
dead-end jobs rather than educational growth and economic support
for those making an enormous cultural and geographic transition
slots refugees into a generic illegitimate immigrant category. They are
treated as lucky to have the chance to be here, responsible for their own
future, devoid of political agency, and obligated to conform culturally. The idea that refuge might include support for managing trauma,
social support for the enormous life transformation resettled refugees
experience, and economic support to ensure that refugees have adequate time to develop language and job skills is absent because the U.S.
lacks a developed public discourse that refuge should include anything other than physical relocation. As one resettled Somali refugee
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asked rhetorically in a conversation with me about his experiences in
coming here, “What is the basic reason that you bring me to an ocean
and then tell me to go swim by myself?” The sink-or-swim attitude is
a neo-liberal definition of refuge, steeped in economic rationalities and
valuations.
VIII. Conclusion
The resettlement of Somali Bantu refugees in America was to be a
humanitarian act to bring persecuted refugees from the desperation
and danger of refugee camps to the safety and opportunity of the
United States. For this privilege, Somali Bantu paid for their own airfare (travel on U.S. carriers was mandatory), redefined their identities
and family relationships to meet American criteria for resettlement,
and left behind family members who failed to meet the criteria. In the
U.S., they learned that refuge is an obligation to become a low-wage
earner and that the basis of their humanity as a refugee is limited to
their ability to earn an income.
There is no doubt that the resettlement program saved lives and is
a far better option than life in a refugee camp. But the Lewiston case
shows that refugees who cannot quickly adapt to their new life because
they lack the skills relevant for the American context experience a
lack of support from the American government and society during
their adjustment. In Lewiston, the city found itself utterly unprepared
and unsupported, trying frantically to help refugees adjust, while city
citizens complained and the state’s only VOLAG, local churches, and
nonprofits remained on the sidelines. For the city, as evidenced in the
mayor’s letter, the primary consideration was cost: the presence of
refugees would become an economic burden that they did not want to
shoulder. The dissenting voices who suggested the refugees brought
a revitalizing potential, desirable diversity, and a common humanity
that should provoke empathy were roundly dismissed in blogs and
private and public conversations. Their views were rejected on the
basis of assumptions about how much refugees cost, even when they
cost very little at all.
A blog conversation in response to an article in the Lewiston Sun Journal about a Somali language class taught at Lewiston’s Adult Ed program summarizes the common sentiment. A long series of responses
decrying the Somali language course and opining that Somalis should
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learn English and get jobs concludes with this exchange between two
bloggers identified as joeziehmer and whcosta:
Joeziehmer: “They do want to learn English but in truer form English is
one of the hardest languages to learn. I think this speaks volumes about
the intellectual failings on display of racism and prejudice concerning
learning a language as opposed to learning empathy. Imagine if you
cared enough to pay attention to immigrant cultural developments in
history class whcosta.”
whcosta: “I don’t though. I care about economics.”41

In conclusion, the claim that refugee resettlement is a noble expression of humanitarianism is actually a shallow humanitarianism,
guided more by an ethic of punitive neo-liberalism than one of generous humanism. The example of Somali Bantus is illustrative. By choosing a group defined as one of the most vulnerable, impoverished, and
subjugated, the government is making a symbolic statement of the
U.S. as a welcoming nation. Yet the refugees’ incorporation into the
nation positions them with other vulnerable, marginalized groups
whose inclusion is defined by surveillance, discipline, moral judgment, humiliation, and a neo-liberal calculus that defines one’s worth
as equivalent to one’s earning power.
If the humanitarianism of a country can be evaluated by its treatment of its poorest, most vulnerable members, scholars like Brett
Williams, T. M. Luhrmann, and Philippe Bourgois have shown that
the U.S. treats its most vulnerable (such as the poor, the mentally ill
homeless, the drug-addicted homeless) with punitive and humiliating
policies rather than humanist ones.42 Resettled illiterate refugees join
others who struggle against enormous barriers to live a decent, satisfying, sustainable life but who are judged for their failures in a system in
which everything is stacked against them. The help they are given is
so modest compared to their needs. However, the rationale that they
are being saved from the horror of refugee camps and being given the
opportunity for a new life seems to excuse the extension of limited
generosity in assisting their resettlement.
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